Ciência Política

Os orçamentos participativos, instrumento de gestão urbana com referenciais balizados em preceitos das democracias participativa e deliberativa com enfoque no debate popular acerca do orçamento público, surgiu no Brasil e teve, nos últimos 30 anos, massiva expansão global, ganhando especial destaque em Portugal, hoje um dos principais estudos de caso mundial. O objetivo desta pesquisa foi analisar essa disseminação interna no país e quais suas consequências territoriais e na gestão urbana do país. Para tal, articulou-se coleta de dados quantitativos e qualitativos em escala nacional, de forma a englobar todos os processos locais já realizadas (e ainda ocorrendo) em território lusitano, sendo que estes foram tabulados e espacializados se utilizando de ferramentas SIG. Aos dados foram somados o debate teórico e conceitual envolvendo as condições institucionais para participação de qualidade, com especial enfoque em uma abordagem territorial, utilizando-se do referencial da ciência geográfica, o que permitiu a composição do conceito de impacto territorial. A coleta empírica, em conjunto com as discussões realizadas na comparação com os achados da literatura científica especializada, resultou na identificação de que a maior parte dos OPs em curso (e também finalizados) em Portugal pouco servem como instrumentos de gestão urbana, relegados ao papel de “laboratório de participação”, interferindo minimamente nas relações de poder pré-estabelecidas nas cidades lusitanas. Com a exceção parcial da experiência de Cascais (em constante evolução e ainda com muitas potencialidades), os orçamentos participativos portugueses são instáveis institucionalmente, geram baixa mobilização popular e discutem valores orçamentários irrisórios, estando à margem das principais decisões políticas (apesar do intenso marketing, que tenta mostrar o contrário) e do binômio gestão-planejamento urbano do país lusitano.

This thesis seeks to explore how drug cartels achieved de facto sovereign control over the favelas of Rio de Janeiro between 2000 and 2010, effectively preventing the Brazilian state from guaranteeing the rule of law uniformly throughout national territory. It also investigates the extent to which Brazilian citizens have suffered human rights abuses as a result. Drawing on both primary and secondary evidence, I argue that drug cartels gained sovereignty over these enclaves as a combined result of state weakness and cartel strength. The Brazilian state forfeited these territories a century ago, because it was infrastructurally weak to such an extent that it was unable to systematically penetrate them in order to monopolize violence, enforce laws, and provide public services. The cartels, in turn, exploited the favelas as ideal locations for the transport, repackaging, and sale of drugs. Benefiting from the profits of illicit activities, the gangs transformed into well-armed, bellicose organizations that maintained authority over the communities by performing state-like duties. In due course, organized crime amassed sufficient control over the favelas to thwart most state encroachments. Examining the exceptions, I found that the limited police encroachments were largely rights abusive—save those made by the Pacifying Police Units. State weakness and cartel strength have disjointed the rule of law and undermined democracy in Brazil.

Abstract: Does a strong civil society always develop politically engaged citizens? Other researchers have demonstrated a link between civil society and political participation, but I show that this connection is by no means inevitable. Some civil society organizations encourage citizens to participate in the political arena, but others do not. Drawing on data gathered through nearly 200 interviews with staff members of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, as well as participant observation of ten grassroots organizations spanning five favela communities there, I find that the organizations with the greatest financial resources are least active in politically relevant mobilization. A crucial component of citizenship is the right and duty to participate in political life, but most residents of Rio's favelas suffer from "citizenship poverty." Historical structural inequality, as well as the current influence of drug- and weapons-trafficking gangs, sharply curtail favela residents' ability to exercise their rights as citizens, particularly with respect to collective action. Some favela residents have created small "social benefit" CSOs to address community needs, principally around issues of employment and health care. However, social benefit CSOs do not have sufficient levels of resources to mobilize, much less advocate for broader citizenship rights. "Golden" CSOs also work within Rio's favelas. These large, well-funded organizations have a strong international reputation and could direct some of their resources toward collective action. In practice, however, golden CSOs undertake tame activities that pose no challenge to anyone in large part due to the "civil society resource curse." Just as discovering oil is usually assumed to bring economic advantages to a nation, we might expect resource-rich golden CSOs to bring the most benefits to communities at the local level. Similar to countries rich in natural resources, however, golden CSOs are also dependent on a single source of revenue, usually grants from large foundations. In turn, the process of obtaining funding encourages golden CSOs to build elite-led, relatively isolated organizations that conduct donor-driven activities. Such an organizational profile is ideal for winning grants, but not for connecting citizens with the political arena. While many golden CSOs do good work within Rio's most marginalized communities, they tend to avoid political activity and do not address the citizenship deficit that exists. With much smaller budgets and fewer tangible resources, grassroots "citizenship" CSOs seem to be unlikely candidates for galvanizing favela residents, yet these organizations are the very ones that have taken the lead. Instead of focusing on grant funding, citizenship CSOs seek out many types of resources from multiple sources. In doing so, they face a different set of organizational incentives, which encourage local leadership, broad networks, and extraordinary flexibility in choosing their activities. Such an organizational profile allows citizenship CSOs to draw on their connections, credibility, and ingenuity to conduct political action targeting both society and the state. My analysis demonstrates that merely building civil society is not enough to guarantee a politically active citizenry. CSOs with singular and narrow resource acquisition strategies are particularly unlikely to pose challenges to the political status quo. In turn, donors who want to achieve social, economic, and political outcomes by building civil society should pay attention to the incentives present within the local context, particularly those that shape the funding arena. Copies of dissertations may be obtained by addressing your request to ProQuest, 789 E. Eisenhower Parkway, P.O. Box 1346, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346. Telephone 1-800-521-3042; e-mail: disspub@umi.com

In preparation for the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016, Police Pacification Units (UPP) are being installed in the favelas, or shantytowns, of Rio de Janeiro in order to end drug trafficker rule and to clean up the look and reputation of the city. After witnessing residents' dissatisfaction with the pacification project in the favela Rocinha, this paper addresses why favela community members are concerned about the loss of community trafficking groups. Traffickers provide services to communities, including security and funk dances--an essential part of favela community life and cultural memory. Funk's performance highlights the unique culture of the favela, rejecting the hierarchy of mainstream Brazilian society and promoting a local culture and system. State occupations have led to the shutdown of many trafficker provided social services and repression of funk culture.

Using an original panel constructed from micro data on crime and social assistance program coverage in Rio de Janeiro, this dissertation analyzes the impact of two very different government led initiatives - one an intensive law enforcement program targeting gang controlled favela communities and the other a conditional cash transfer program for schooling - on rates of violent crime from January 2006 through June 2011. I find strong evidence that both programs depressed neighborhood-level rates of robbery and homicide over this period, inconclusive evidence of effects on rates of disappeared persons, and no evidence of effects on rates of rape and sexual assault. 

Drug gangs and organized criminal groups rarely evolve into structured authorities governing their resident communities. Where this occurs, however, they may effectively replace the state in its most basic functions, and consequently exclude subject populations from the rights and protections supposedly guaranteed by the state. Employing qualitative research methods, this study compares criminal development and state public security policies in Rio de Janeiro and Recife, Brazil. The research is primarily concerned with the development of criminal authority structures, and asks when, where, why, and how they develop. Arguing that the extant literature on organized crime fails to adequately explain this phenomenon—particularly in the case of drug trafficking gangs—I draw from the civil wars literature to theoretically explain the rise of non-state authority structures. The parallels are compelling. In Rio de Janeiro, concentrated illicit wealth created by the cocaine boom in the 1980s attracted an international arms market that helped drug gangs dominate larger territories (i.e. opportunities), while indiscriminate and lethally violent state repression pushed non-criminal publics into a de facto alliance with drug traffickers (i.e. grievance). In this context gangs--and later, militias--developed clear and structured governing functions. Other factors, such as inhibiting geography, also contributed to this authoritative duality. In Recife, by contrast, drug gangs have remained small, disorganized, and unengaged in local political structures. A smaller drug market, flat and vehicle-accessible slums, and a comparatively much less violent police force help to explain the failure of gangs and other criminal groups to develop broader authoritative functions.

The rapid process of urbanization currently swelling the poor urban neighborhoods of developing countries is changing local and national political landscapes. As the population of urban poor continues to grow - it is expected that by 2030 half of the total urban population will be poor - so are poor peoples' demands for access to public services, as well as the type and intensity of their engagements with political actors. The dissertation focuses on the different types of interactions between the urban poor and politicians and specifically tackles the following questions: What explains the variation in political participation among the urban poor? What drives the urban poor to become active in politics? What types of political activity are these citizens engaging in? The dissertation uses a mixed-methods strategy that makes use of a case study of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and survey data, including an original dataset that includes interviews with over 400 favela dwellers. It finds that in Brazil, there is a 'favela effect' in political participation: favela dwellers are more likely to become politically engaged in a number of activities - voting, working for a politician, participating in neighborhood meetings - than people living in more affluent neighborhoods. In addition, the dissertation demonstrates that there are multiple pathways to political participation and that four factors are key in explaining the levels of political engagement: social networks, religious groups, government transfer schemes, and NGO programs. The dissertation contributes to the literature on political participation and democracy, and helps move the debate on political engagement of the urban poor beyond arguments that, on the one hand, portray them as uninterested or unable to engage in political activities and, on the other hand, describe them as the inevitable victims of clientelism and political bosses